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Project-based mechanisms for emissions reductions credits, like the Clean Development 
Mechanism, pose important challenges for policy design because of several inherent 
characteristics. Participation is voluntary. Evaluating reductions requires assigning a baseline for 
a counterfactual that cannot be measured. Some investments have both economic and 
environmental benefits and might occur anyway. Uncertainty surrounds both emissions and 
investment returns. Parties to the project are likely to have more information than the certifying 
authority. The certifying agent is limited in its ability to design a contract that would reveal 
investment intentions. As a result, rules for baseline determination may be systematically biased 
to overallocate, and they also risk creating inefficient investment incentives. This paper evaluates, 
in a situation with asymmetric information, the efficacy of the main baseline rules currently under 
consideration:   historical emissions,   average industry emissions, and  expected emissions.  
Key Words:  climate policy, Clean Development Mechanism, baseline emissions,  
asymmetric information 
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The flexibility mechanisms envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol include not only emissions 
trading among participating countries, but also project-based emissions reductions in countries 
not subject to an emissions cap. In particular, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows 
investment projects that reduce emissions in developing countries to count toward compliance 
goals in developed countries. Although such projects hold potential for significant gains in terms 
of development and lower-cost abatement opportunities, they also pose challenges for policy 
design. These challenges arise from certain inherent characteristics:  
•  CDM participation is voluntary. 
•  Many emissions-reducing projects provide other benefits beyond the value of 
emissions credits, so some of those investments might occur anyway.   
•  Evaluating project-based reductions requires assigning a baseline for the 
emissions that would occur in the absence of the project, which cannot be 
measured.  
•  Considerable uncertainty surrounds the determination of that counterfactual.  
•  Access to information will likely be asymmetric. The third-party monitor that will 
certify emissions reductions will know less about the project fundamentals than 
the investing and recipient parties.  
•  The certifying agent is limited in its ability to design a contract that would elicit 
truthful information from CDM participants regarding their investment intentions. 
The certification authority can only set the amount of abatement credits, while 
market forces determine the value of emissions reductions. Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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The combination of those factors means that rules for baseline determination may be 
systematically biased. The costs of poor baseline determination range from underallocation, 
which means forgoing some worthy projects, to overallocation, which expands the global 
emissions cap and may encourage some unjustified investments. This paper uses a stylized 
model to evaluate, in a situation of uncertainty and asymmetric information, the efficacy of the 
main baseline rules currently under consideration:1  
1) historical  emissions; 
2)  average emissions for the industry; and 
3) expected  emissions. 
The next section presents background for CDM projects and the economic and 
uncertainty issues that are likely to accompany them. The following section develops a model to 
assess the impact of baseline allocations on incentives to engage in emissions-reducing 
investments, given information asymmetries. The final section discusses the welfare implications 
of different policies for baseline determination. 
Background 
The Clean Development Mechanism, as conceived in the Kyoto Protocol, has dual 
objectives. One is to help the parties in Annex I (the developed countries) achieve their 
commitment targets at a lower cost than relying fully on efforts conducted at home. Another 
objective is to provide sustainable development opportunities for the non-Annex I parties. To 
receive certified emissions reductions (CERs), countries developing or funding projects through 
the mechanism would have to ensure that benefits also accrue to host countries (Art. 12(3)). 
Both the quantity of abatement to be certified and the benefits to the developing country 
partner would be evaluated on a project-by-project basis. For the latter evaluation, the type of 
benefits considered and recognized may be important. For example, a requirement for 
                                                 
1 UNFCCC (2001). Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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technology to be transferred could imply a very different set of potential projects than merely 
allowing for a monetary transfer in exchange for reductions. For the types of projects that serve 
dual purposes of productivity enhancement and environmental improvement, as stipulated by the 
protocol, the evaluation of emissions reductions may then be quite complicated because of the 
problem of disentangling influences. 
In principle, ensuring compliance in Annex I countries is a relatively straightforward 
task: because they are subject to an overall emissions cap, one need monitor only emissions.2 
Knowing what would have happened in the absence of the cap helps in estimating the 
opportunity costs to the economy, but it is not necessary for compliance (except, perhaps, in the 
thorny area of carbon sinks). The CDM, however, does not operate under a cap; because it is a 
project-by-project mechanism, to certify actual reductions to credit against Annex I caps, one 
must know not only actual emissions but also the emissions that would have occurred in the 
absence of the project. 
Baselines and Welfare 
True additionality requires that the allocated baseline not exceed what would have 
happened had the firm not participated in CDM. Unfortunately, that information is highly 
uncertain. As a result, the certifying authority runs the risk of guessing too high or too low in 
awarding CERs (equivalently, guessing too low or too high on baseline emissions). Guessing too 
high a baseline and giving away too many CERs means expanding the overall emissions cap for 
Annex I countries, which implies some marginal increase in the potential damages from climate 
change. Guessing too low a baseline, on the other hand, means forgoing the benefits of a cost-
effective greenhouse gas−reduction project and valuable local benefits. 
Consider the baseline problem from the vantage point of the global community, ignoring 
for now issues of the international distribution of effort, benefits, and costs. In weighing the risks 
                                                 
2 For the most part, emissions monitoring can be achieved by tracking the entry of fossil fuels into the economy; 
most Annex I countries have sufficient infrastructure for compiling accurate data (Russia may be a notable 
exception). Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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of under- or overallocation, one must consider the net costs or benefits of expanding the cap 
compared with the cost savings from shifting the location of abatement effort. If the true baseline 
is allocated, then overall emissions do not change. However, in shifting some abatement from 
areas where the marginal costs are high to areas where marginal abatement costs are low (even 
zero), we have made the total costs of achieving that overall cap strictly lower. Therefore, total 
global welfare is strictly higher. A corollary to this result is that one can allocate somewhat more 
than the true baseline without lowering welfare. How much more depends on whether the 
marginal benefits from reducing emissions (reduced potential climate change burden) are higher 
or lower than the marginal costs of reducing emissions. If they are approximately equal, the extra 
damages from loosening the cap are roughly offset by the cost savings from doing less 
abatement. If marginal costs are higher, welfare improves from loosening the too-tight cap. If 
marginal damages are higher, welfare is lost by expanding the cap, and fewer permits in excess 
of the baseline can be allocated without lowering overall welfare. 
The full cost of inappropriate baseline determination is economic, not just environmental. 
Receipt of the baseline allocation is conditional on participation, and participation is also 
conditional on technology transfers; all these decisions are voluntary and depend in part on the 
attractiveness of the allocation. Thus, baseline rules do not merely redistribute the rents and 
compliance costs of greenhouse gas policy, they may also introduce complex incentives for 
potential participants. The cost of inappropriate incentives is not just unintended redistribution of 
wealth in permits but wasted resources. 
Uncertain and Unequal Information 
The critical problem is that although actual emissions can be verified, actual reductions 
cannot. One cannot predict what baseline emissions would have been any better than one can 
predict what emissions will be.  
Many factors contribute to uncertainty about the baseline and about the profitability of an 
investment project. Fuel prices may fluctuate, consumer tastes may change, exchange rate 
movements can affect exporting industries, regulation or deregulation can affect electricity 
production and prices, and other macroeconomic variables have an impact on demand for Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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energy-intensive products. Many of these factors are just as uncertain to the firm or project 
manager as to the authority that certifies the emissions reductions. If that were all, the certifying 
authority could assign a baseline rule based on mutually shared expectations, and the investing 
firm would act according to those expectations.  
In many instances, however, the project participants may have better information than the 
certifying authority.3 Firms may differ in the state of their existing production capital, in their 
management's ability to implement a change in technology, or in local demand conditions. The 
profitability of a given technology transfer can vary across firms, and the firms are more likely to 
know what their particular economic gains are. If that information is private and cannot be 
obtained without significant cost, a discrepancy is created between the certifying authority's 
expectations about what the firm would do in the absence of the CDM project and the firm's own 
expectations. This discrepancy poses serious challenges for designing baseline rules. 
This baseline issue is complicated by the dual nature of many technologies. Some 
technologies are single-purpose and reduce emissions without significantly affecting the rest of 
the production process: the retrofit of scrubbers to remove pollutants at the “end of the pipe,” for 
example. However, these options are essentially nonexistent for greenhouse gas emissions. 
Typically, the reduction of greenhouse gases entails a major change in the use of fossil fuel 
inputs and their related products. Many investments that would produce significant emissions 
reductions through major production process changes could also then produce significant 
economic gains, and vice versa. For example, an improved production technology may also be 
more energy efficient, reducing both emissions and the costs of fuel inputs. Although 
productivity increases and emissions decreases are both good things, determining environmental 
additionality can then be tricky. 
                                                 
3 Project participants may be foreign direct investors, host country governments, or firms. We consider cases where 
these actors have better information about the project than the authority certifying the emissions reductions. Others 
consider cases where information asymmetries exist between the parties to the project themselves (e.g., the host 
country may have better knowledge of the true profitability than the foreign investor). See Hagem (1996).  Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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Investment in productive capital or new technology is costly, and the project investors 
weigh the economic value of the project against those costs. Some projects will pass this 
economic test and go forward regardless of climate change policy. However, in addition to the 
economic benefits, there may also be environmental benefits to the project. The firm will not 
value them in the absence of some intervention or opportunity, such as joining a CDM program. 
If a firm participates in a CDM project, the total return then equals the economic value plus the 
sales of CERs. (Note that once a firm is participating, incentives are then in place to make 
changes in variable production factors to reduce emissions beyond those from the technological 
change.) The baseline allocation thus determines whether otherwise unprofitable projects are 
implemented. 
CDM Contracts and Asymmetric Information 
Asymmetry in access to information is a potentially serious problem for calculating 
CERs. Because participation in CDM projects is voluntary, certain baseline allocation methods 
run the risk of selection bias––attracting participants who would be predisposed to making such 
investments and having low emissions anyway. For example, suppose CDM candidates have a 
good idea what their baseline emissions would be, but the certifying authority does not. A firm 
that is planning to be a lower emitter would like to pretend to be a higher future emitter, in order 
to get a larger allocation.4  
Economic theory offers ideas for designing contracts to induce project proponents to 
reduce such distortion, or even to fully reveal what type they are.5 Normally, this involves 
offering the firm a menu of different combinations of quantities (e.g., production, effort, or 
abatement) and corresponding prices. The two contract variables (price and quantity) are used to 
identify firms with different preferences over those aspects. In this context, each contract in the 
                                                 
4 Wirl et al. (1998) show that in the absence of an exogenously set baseline, countries participating in a jointly 
implemented project have incentives to cheat in announcing their intentions, both to each other and to the certifying 
authority. 
5 Much of the theory of optimal contract design is derived from the theory of optimal regulation of monopolies. See 
Laffont and Tirole (1993) and Loeb and Magat (1979). Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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menu would have to specify a certain fixed transfer payment (and thereby a certain price) for 
each fixed amount of abatement.  
The attention given to project-based mechanisms in the literature has focused mostly on 
the impact of asymmetric information and costly enforcement between the project partners in a 
bilateral exchange.6 It is generally assumed that abatement can be measured ex post, information 
about abatement costs is incomplete, and the investor has declining marginal benefits to 
abatement.7 Three problems make these kinds of traditional models either impractical or 
inapplicable to a decentralized Clean Development Mechanism with third-party validation.  
First, in a competitive market for CDM projects and other fungible international carbon 
credits and allowances, the price of emissions reductions is likely to be fixed by international 
markets; a contracting party would find it difficult to deviate from prevailing permit prices. In 
fact, these revelation methods are unnecessary if the investing country's abatement cost function 
is relatively flat in the area of the corresponding abatement amount. It could offer a constant 
price per unit of abatement (the international market price), and an efficient amount would be 
achieved in the absence of any information about the agent's costs: this is the beauty of 
decentralized markets. Bargaining with “menus,” as described above, is useful only if the goal is 
to obtain part of the inframarginal rents or if marginal benefits are declining.8 
Second, the certifying authority is not designing a full contract for abatement. It 
determines the categories of projects that are eligiblecoal plant modernization versus 
renewable energyand the procedures by which actual emissions reductions are calculated and 
certified. In defining the baseline against which abatement is measured, the certifying authority 
                                                 
6 For example, Hagem (1996) considers the problem of contract design for an investing country firm that does not 
know the true cost to the host country partner of conducting abatement. Liski and Virrankoski (2001) focus on 
transaction costs in bilateral bargaining. Janssen (1999) considers third-party enforcement of bilateral transactions.  
7 Millock and Hourcade (2001) are an exception, introducing uncertainty over abatement levels into the bilateral 
framework. 
8 The existence of these competitive opportunities is why developing countries’ CER suppliers are better off 
creating credits for competitive sale than with isolated bilateral deals where foreign investor can capture much 
surplus. See Narain and Van ‘t Veld (2001). Babu and Bibhas (1996) look at the effect of bargaining power on the 
distribution of gains from bilateral negotiations over abatement and price. Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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cannot induce two types of eligible projects to make the different conditions known by choosing 
different packages of provisions, since a larger baseline is always preferred, regardless of type. A 
believable information-gathering and punishment mechanism would be necessary to design 
procedures that induce the revelation of firm-specific factors that affect baselines.  
Third, and most problematic, these revelation mechanisms assume that actual abatement 
can be established, albeit with a cost to monitoring. Unfortunately, the target of the necessary 
monitoring and enforcement mechanism is a hypothetical behavior, not an actual one. Although 
actual emissions can be observed, emissions in the absence of the project cannot, and actual 
abatement may therefore be impossible to know.9 
Allocation and the Investor 
Since project-by-project information gathering is very costly, some general rules for 
determining project-level emissions baselines have been proposed: historical emissions, average 
emissions, and expected emissions. Each rule has its own biases in the departure from actual 
baselines and in incentives to participate. We now focus on the incentives of the investing party, 
which for simplicity we will call “the firm.” Projects may of course be undertaken by a variety of 
entities, including governments, joint partnerships, multinational corporations, and local 
businesses; the key assumption is merely that the parties undertaking the investment and 
abatement activities are distinct from the authority certifying the amount of emissions 
reductions. We analyze in particular the role of fixed costs in the decision to participate in a 
CDM project. 
Model with Investment Prerequisite 
The differences between the baseline rules can be illustrated with a simple example using 
an investment in a clean, nonemitting technology. The new production process brings two 
potential payoffs to the firm: 1) cost savings in proportion to initial emissions, reflecting reduced 
                                                 
9 This concern is raised by Bohm (1994). Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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use of energy inputs; and 2) an increase in general productivity, yielding additional profits. 
These profits vary from one investment project to another because of market conditions, 
managers’ and workers’ skills, or technical expertise. These terms will be represented with the 
following variables:   
k  Investment cost (annualized) 
π   Economic benefits 
µ   Initial emissions 
s  Savings per unit of emissions 
reduced 
t  Market price of emission permits 
We assume that the firm knows the value of all those variables with certainty, but the 
profit variable is unknown to the certifying authority. Initial emissions rates also vary by firm, 
affecting the total returns of the investment, but they are assumed not to be correlated with the 
firm-specific profit. The certifying authority can verify initial emissions. However, without 
knowing the profit variable, it cannot determine actual baseline emissions.  
Since the investment reduces emissions to zero in this example, the baseline allocation 
equals the quantity of certified emissions reductions granted. These CERs can be sold at the 
market price of permits.  
Policy Scenarios 
We compare five scenarios: 
No Policy 
In the absence of CDM, investment will go ahead if the profits and energy savings justify 
itthat is, if  0 > − + k sµ π . The value of emissions reductions does not play a role.  Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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Optimal 
The firms one would want to target are those whose emissions are costly enough in 
environmental terms that they would justify investment, even though profits and energy savings 
alone would not:  0 sk t sk π µµπ µ +− +> > +− .  
Historical Emissions 
With a baseline rule of allocating historical emissions µ , firm will invest if 
0 > + − + µ µ π t k s .  The environmental value of emissions reductions enters into consideration, 
lowering the investment hurdle according to the firm’s initial emissions. Thus, all the firms that 
can justify the investment in terms of social costs and benefits undertake it. Those that would 
invest under no policy still do, and their profits are raised by the value of the allocation.  
Average Emissions 
An industry average baseline offers µ  credits to each project joining the program. This 
baseline lowers the hurdle across the board, without respect to the individual emissions saved. If 
investment is a precondition for participating in the CDM program, a firm will invest and join if 
0 > + − + µ µ π t k s . Thus, some of the firms with emissions that are sufficiently costly to the 
environment do not have enough incentive to invest: tk st µ πµµ >−− > . Meanwhile, some 
firms with relatively low emissions are given the extra push to invest, something they would not 
have done under the historical emissions baseline: tk st µ πµµ < −− < .  
Expected Emissions 
Under an expected emissions rule, the certifying authority assesses with the information 
available what emissions would be in the counterfactual. The authority is here assumed to 
observe initial emissions and determine expected emissions, knowing the odds that an 
investment would be made in the absence of policy. In other words, { } (Pr{ }) Ek s µ πµ µ = >− .  
Table 1 summarizes the decision of the firm to invest and participate in a CDM project, 
according to different baseline allocation rules.  Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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Table 1: Investment Decisions under Different Baseline Rules 
  Invest if 
No policy  sk π µ + >  
Historical baseline  stk π µµ + +>  
Industry average baseline  stk π µµ + +>  
Expected emissions baseline  {} st E k π µµ + +>  
 
Equilibrium with Uniform Distribution 
To compare the effects of different baseline rules, we need to evaluate the equilibrium 
investment and emissions, given a continuum of projects with varying profiles of economic 
benefits and emissions reductions. Consider the following demonstration using independent, 
uniform distributions of emissions rates and profits, with  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ µ ,  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ π ,  1 = k  and 0<s<1. 
This normalizes the variables to the investment cost, so that π is the share of those costs 
recouped by profits, µ  is the share of maximum emissions, and s represents the energy savings 
in terms of profits from reducing the emissions share. The assumption that each variable is 
bounded by 1 means that it is not worthwhile to make any investment for profits or energy 
savings alone; both must be present.  
The uniform distribution has convenient properties. For example, the share of projects 
with profits exceeding the investment threshold is easy to interpret. In the absence of a CDM 
policy, given any µ , firms with  ) 1 ( µ π s − ≥  will invest; with the uniform distribution, µ s  is the 
share of firms meeting this threshold, or the odds that a particular project will pass the 
investment hurdle.  
In a more general formulation, let  () A µ  be the firm’s CER allocation under a given 
baseline rule, which may be a function of the initial emissions rate. A firm will invest if 
(1 ( )) st A π µµ ≥− −  when CDM participation is conditional on investment. Thus, with the 




() st A d µ µµ + ∫ . Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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() () st A Ad µ µµ µ + ∫ , 




() st A d µ µµ µ + ∫ . 
  We assume the baseline rules are translated into allocations in the following ways: 
  () A µ : 
No policy  0 
Historical baseline  µ  
Industry average  1/2 µ =  
Expected emissions  (1 ) sµ µ −
Table 2 presents the results for investment costs, allocations, and emissions under the 
different scenarios. Net emissions reflect the impact on global emissions compared with the 
initial state with no investment. The difference results from both the direct reduction in 
emissions and the increase in emissions by the recipients of the certified reductions (which equal 
the allocated baseline in this complete abatement example). 
Table 2: Effects of Baseline Rules with Uniformly Distributed Emissions and Profits 
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With no policy, s/2 is the share of firms with high enough combined profits and 
emissions to invest regardless, abating emissions by s/3. With the historical emissions baseline, 
an additional t/3 units of abatement occur through more investment.  However, both they and all 
other investing firms choose to participate in CDM and are allocated their historical emissions. Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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Since all covered reductions are offset by extra emissions by CER purchasers, total emissions 
rise by the amount of abatement that would have occurred anyway, s/3.  
The industry average emissions baseline has several effects. First, the rule produces 
investment equal to the historical baseline, but the distribution is different.10  High-emitting 
firms have less additional incentive to reduce emissions, while lower-emitting firms have more 
incentive to invest.11  Second, since the investment decision is less sensitive to initial emissions, 
actual abatement is lower, despite equivalent levels of investment. Third, initially high-emitting 
firms that would invest anyway are not allocated as much, but firms with low initial emissions 
are overallocated emissions. With investment as a precondition for joining the program, the net 
effect is a much lower allocation, which then translates into more net reductions than with the 
historical baseline—but not more than with no policy. Without that precondition, we will see in 
the next section that emissions are higher and generally higher than with the historical baseline. 
  The expected emissions rule still overrewards some firms and underrewards others, 
reducing investment compared with the historical baseline. However, the degree of inaccuracy is 
less than with the industry average rules, and the more appropriate investment results in lower 
actual emissions, though still not so low as the historical baseline. But since overallocation is 
tempered, total emissions may be lower.  Also interesting to note is that this is the only rule for 
which net reductions are sensitive to the permit price; in all other cases, the extra incentive for 
abatement is fully offset by extra allocations. 
Model without Investment Precondition 
Opportunities to reduce emissions may exist that do not involve capital investments, like 
modifying the production process or switching to higher-quality fuel. Then, some firms that see 
                                                 
10 Identical investment results from the definition of the industry average has the average of historical emissions.  A 
stricter definition would reduce investment. 
11 Unless they have the option to join the program without investing, which is explored in the next section. Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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little economic benefit to investing could be given an incentive to make worthwhile emissions 
reductions, if participation did not depend on investment. 
Suppose now that undertaking a fixed investment is not a requirement for participation in 
a CDM project.  Firms that choose to participate but not invest then face incentives to use other 
methods to reduce their emissions and generate CERs.  The option to undertake such cost-
effective reductions then also affects the decision of whether to invest or not. 
We assume that the alternative method for reducing emissions has a variable cost equal to 
the corresponding energy savings.12  We also assume that, while investment eliminates 
emissions, this option only partially reduces emissions by (1 ) α − . 
The firm then faces two decisions.  First, the firm will choose whether to participate.  
Profits from participation are the net receipts from permit sales, since the other costs are just 
outweighed by the energy savings.  Thus, the firm will join the program and engage in variable-
cost reductions if the allocation it gets would exceed its remaining emissions:    () A µ αµ > . 
Next, the firm decides whether to invest.  If it would not participate, the investment 
decision remains identical to that in the previous section:  () 0 sk t A π µµ + −+ >.  If it would 
participate anyway, the hurdle is now that profits from investing must be greater than those from 
participating, not just greater than zero.  In this case, the firm would invest if 
0 sk t π µα µ +− + > .  Importantly, this metric is also the socially efficient investment decision, 
meaning that for any baseline rule, if the firm would participate anyway, the decision to invest is 
always cost effective for the additional reductions. 
 Table 3 summarizes the participation and investment decisions under the different 
baseline rules, using the same definitions as in the previous section. 
                                                 
12 For initial units of reduction, this assumption should be quite accurate.  If marginal costs of abatement are 
increasing, it does not reflect the full costs of the reductions.  However, it is a useful simplifying assumption. Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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Table 3: Investment Decisions without Investment Prerequisite 
  Participate if Then, Invest if  Else, Invest if 
No policy  n.a.  sk π µ + >   sk π µ + >  
Historical baseline  1 α <   st k π µα µ + +> stk π µµ + +>  
Industry average baseline  αµµ <   st k π µα µ + +> stk π µµ + +>  
Expected emissions baseline  {} E αµµ <   st k π µα µ + +> {} st E k π µµ + +>
 
 
Equilibrium without Investment Prerequisite 
When investment is not a prerequisite for the CDM, equilibrium behavior reflects the 
additional participation decision.  Let µ  denote the cutoff level of emissions below which firms 
would participate in the CDM without investing, given a baseline rule.  With the uniform 
distribution, total investment equals 
  () ()
1
0
() std st A d
µ
µ
µ αµ µ µ µ µ ++ + ∫∫. 
The total net allocation for the industry equals 
  () ()
1
0
()( 1 ) () () As t d s t A A d
µ
µ
µ µα µ α µµ µ µ µµ −− − + + ∫∫ , 
while actual emissions reduced equal 
  () ()
1
0
(1 ) ( ) st d st A d
µ
µ
µ µα µ α µµ µ µ µ µ −− − + + ∫∫ . 
  The baseline rules give the following emissions participation cutoffs and allocations:13 
 
  µ   () A µ : 
No policy    0 
                                                 
13 For simplicity, we continue to assume that industry average emissions are calculated from no-action behavior 
(historical averages).  If averages are updated to reflect participation and energy-saving investments, the allocations 
will be less generous. Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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Historical baseline  1  µ  
Industry average  / µ α   1/2 µ =  
Expected emissions [(1 )/ ,1] Min s α − (1 ) sµ µ −
 
Note that with the historical baseline, firms will always participate, whether investing or 
not.  With the industry average baseline, everyone will participate if the variable-cost 
adjustments always reduce emissions below the average (in this case, if  1/2 α ≤ ).  For smaller 
reduction rates, then, those starting with lower emissions will be more likely to participate.  With 
expected emissions, participation occurs when (1 ) sµ µα µ − ≥ ; full participation in this case 
holds if 1 s α −> . 
The option to join but not invest creates both positive and negative effects.  On the 
positive side, cheaper reductions are made available and the investment decision is improved for 
imperfect baseline allocations.  On the negative side, overallocation can increase substantially 
for firms with relatively low initial emissions under the industry average baseline rule. 
For example, consider the extreme case where  1 α = .  Then the only firms to participate 
without investing would be those with emissions that are already below the industry average 
with that baseline rule.  In the equilibrium solution, compared to the industry average baseline 
with the investment prerequisite in Table 2, we see that the investment is lower by t/8 and actual 
emissions reduced are lower by t/48.  However, allocations are significantly increased, further 
decreasing net emissions reductions. 






















The numerical section explores the impact of different levels of α . 
Partial Emissions Reduction 
To examine the effect of the assumption of a zero-emissions technology, we now 
consider an investment that does not eliminate emissions but reduces them by fraction (1 ) ρ − . 
The allocation of CERs then equals the baseline allocation net of remaining emissions liabilities. Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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The investment decisions will look largely the same as before for the no-policy case and the 
historical emissions baseline. However, some complications arise in cases where the baseline 
does not reflect initial emissions. When reductions were complete, postinvestment emissions 
were necessarily less than allocated baseline emissions. With incomplete emissions reductions, a 
positive net allocation of CERs is not assured for all baseline rules. Therefore, one must consider 
the option to invest but not join the CDM program.  
We assume that the reductions from the investment are made instead of, rather than in 
addition to, those available from variable-cost efforts.14  For investment to ever be worthwhile, it 
must result in fewer emissions than with alternative means; thus, we assume  ρ α < .  It follows 
that if a firm would join the program when not investing, it would want to join the program after 
investing.  The investment decision is then  (1 ) ( ) 0 sk t π ρµ α ρµ + −− + −> . 
If the firm would not participate absent an investment, two questions remain.  First, 
would the emissions remaining after investment be lower than the baseline allocation and justify 
participation after investment?  Second, is investment justified?  If postinvestment participation 
is guaranteed, then the investment decision includes the rents from the net allocation: 
(1 ) ( ( ) ) 0 sk t A π ρµ µ ρ µ +− − + − > .   
However, if  () A ρµµ > , participation is not worthwhile, but the firm may still choose to 
invest, doing so according to the incentives under no policy:  (1 ) 0 sk π ρµ + −− > .  To the extent 
that such investment occurs without participation, the program avoids overallocating permits. On 
the other hand, inaccuracies in baseline allocation can also distort marginal investment 
incentives.  
In the cases described here, investment without participation would only occur under the 
industry average baseline scenario.  Historical emissions baselines always ensure a positive net 
                                                 
14 This assumption does not significantly change the flavor of the results.  If the variable cost options are not merely 
alternative but additive opportunities, participation in a CDM project can induce firms to find reductions in addition 
to those afforded by the investment. This incentive means that some gain is made with the firms that would have 
invested anyway, reducing some of the overallocation problem. Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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allocation.  Since expected emissions are defined here as a weighted average of initial emissions 
and postinvestment emissions (where the weights derive from the probability distribution of 
profits), the participation condition always holds in our example.  However, we note that if 
expectations are formed by other means, like industry averages, participation will not necessarily 
follow investment. 
Table 4 summarizes the investment decisions under different baseline rules, conditional 
on emissions characteristics. 
Table 4: Investment Decisions with Partial Reductions 
  Participate 
if 
Then, Invest if  Else, Invest if 
No policy  n.a.  (1 ) sk π ρµ +− >   (1 ) sk π ρµ + −>  
Historical 
baseline 
1 α <   (1 ) ( ) st k π ρµ α ρµ +− + − > (1 ) (1 ) stk π ρµ ρµ + −+ −>  
Industry average 
baseline 
αµµ <   (1 ) ( ) st k π ρµ α ρµ +− + − > (1 ) ( ) st k π ρµ µ ρ µ + −+ −>  
if  ρµµ < , else invest if 




{} E αµµ <   (1 ) ( ) st k π ρµ α ρµ +− + − > (1 ) ( { } ) st E k π ρµ µ ρ µ + −+ −>
Returning to the uniform distribution example, under conditions such that postinvestment 
emissions are sufficiently reduced (i.e., they always fall below the industry average), all the 
baseline scenarios basically resemble their counterparts in the complete abatement example. The 
energy and tax savings are diluted by the incomplete nature of the reductions. 
An important different arises in the case of the industry average baseline, where the 
participation requirement is 1/2 ρµ < .  For any  1/2 ρ ≤ , investing firms will always participate. 
 However, for lower reduction rates, some high emitters may want to invest but not join the 




(1 ) Max[1/ 2 ,0] st d ρ µρ µ µ −+ − ∫ . Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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Numerical Comparison 
To compare the effects of different baseline rules in these different situations, we present 
a numerical example.  Solving for the uniform distribution example, we apply the parameter 
values s=0.2 and t=0.8 to illustrate the results.   
Complete Reductions from Investment 
The Table 5 assumes no opportunities for variable cost reductions (α=1), which is 
equivalent to an investment prerequisite.  Table 6 assumes a 10% reduction in emissions can be 
achieved without investment.   
As expected, eliminating the investment requirement increases participation and reduces 
investment.  Since the variable-cost reductions are relatively small, actual emissions reduced 
decrease with fewer firms opting to invest.  The important changes occur with the latter two 
baseline rules.   
Table 5: s=.2 and t=.8; α=1 
 Investment CERs 
(% of actual)
Emissions Reduced 
(% from No Policy)
Net Reductions
 
No Policy  .1  0   .067 .067 
Historic Baseline  .5  .333  (125%) .333  (80%)   0  
Industry Average  .5  .250  (136%) .267  (62%)  .017 
Expected Emissions  .447  .250  (110%) .293  (68%)  .044 












No Policy  .05  0   .067 .067 
Historic Baseline  .460  (1)  .326  (126%) .326  (75%)   0 
Industry Average  .389  (.80)  .310  (163%) .256  (59%)  -.053 
Expected Emissions  .443  (.83)  .252  (108%) .301  (70%)  .049 
With the investment prerequisite, the industry average baseline encourages as much 
investment as the historic baseline, but it is less effective at generating actual reductions.  
However, it does not overallocate as many CERs, ensuring a positive net reduction.  When the Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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prerequisite is eliminated, similar actual reductions are achieved with less investment costs, but 
the industry average baseline allocates so many CERs that net reductions are negative. 
With the investment prerequisite, the expected emissions policy generates less 
investment than either of the other baseline rules, and actual reductions that fall in between those 
of the historical and average baselines; however, since fewer CERs are given, net reductions are 
larger.  Eliminating the prerequisite then allows more cost-effective reductions and more 
accurate allocation, resulting in an improvement in net reductions. 
Table 7 shows that for a small enough α  such that participation always occurs, the 
investment and abatement decisions become identical across baseline rules.  The only difference 
then lies in the allocation, for which the expected emissions rule performs the best. 
Table 7: s=.2 and t=.8; α=.5 
  Invest 
 
CERs 
(% of actual) 
Emissions Reduced
(% from No Policy) 
Net Reductions 
No Policy  .05    0   .067 .067 
Historic Baseline  .3     .35    .35  (81%)   0 
Industry Average  .3  .35    .35  (81%)   0 
Expected Emissions  .3  .283  .35  (81%)  .067 
 
Incomplete Reductions from Investment 
To illustrate the impact of incomplete proportional reductions, Table 8 assumes 50% 
reductions in emissions (ρ=0.5; just enough such that no investors will retain above-average 
emissions).  
Table 8: s=.2 and t=.8; ρ=.5; α=1 
 Investment CERs 
(% of actual)
Emissions Reduced
(% from No Policy)
Net Reductions
No Policy  .05  0   .017 .017 
Historic Baseline  .25  .083  (125%) .083 (17%)   0 
Industry Average  .25  .075  (209%) .033  (7%)  –.041 
Expected Emissions  .207  .060  (105%) .073 (15%)  .011  
 Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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(% of actual) 
Emissions 
Reduced 
(% from No 
Policy) 
Net Reductions
No Policy  .05  0   .017 .017 
Historic Baseline  .21  (1)  .106  (119%)  .106  (22%)   0 
Industry Average  .139  (.63)  .158  (437%)  .053   (11%)  –.105 
Expected Emissions  .193  (.66)  .068  (102%)  .083  (17%)  .017 
 
The historical baseline, with its efficient investment incentives, always accomplishes the 
most actual reductions. When reductions are large, the historical baseline also allocates the most, 
in absolute terms. However, the industry average baseline without the investment prerequisite 
always overallocates the most compared with actual reductions, the result being the highest total 
emissions. When reductions are half of initial emissions, it also allocates the most in absolute 
terms.  
The industry average baseline with the investment prerequisite encourages as much 
investment as the historical baseline but has a lesser effect on emissions reductions. The 
expected emissions baseline generates more reductions and fewer allocations than either of the 
averaging baselines, and although the reductions are lower than with the historical baseline, the 
allocations are significantly smaller.  
It is interesting to note that in no case do total emissions fall compared with no policy; 
allocations always outweigh (or at least offset) actual reductions. As discussed earlier, the net 
cost of this expansion in terms of welfare depends on the difference between the marginal 
benefits and costs of abatement.   
Discussion 
We have focused on investment decisions to understand how baseline rules might affect 
decisions to incur significant fixed costs. However, other aspects are important for evaluating the 
likely effects of different baseline rules on efficiency and welfare. For example, managing 
participation and certifying reductions may involve significant administrative or transaction Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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costs.  Also, the distinction between lump-sum and rate-based allocation schemes merits 
attention. Production is a behavior that affects total emissions. For rules that determine the 
baseline as an emissions rate multiplied by actual output, the participating firm can increase its 
allocation of emissions credits by increasing production. As a result, rate-based baseline rules 
also subsidize production, which can have important implications for emissions. 
This section offers both a summary and a broader comparison of the baseline allocation 
rules, enriched by a discussion of not only the investment incentives but also the behavioral 
effects and welfare consequences that are less readily quantified. 
Evaluation of Proposed Baseline Rules 
Absolute Historical Emissions  
A rule using historical emissions as a baseline would function like a lump-sum (versus 
behavior-dependent) allocation of emissions permits.15 Since such an allocation is fixed, then 
conditional on project participation, the incentives for abatement behavior are efficient, meaning 
reductions will be made as long as the additional costs do not outweigh the price of permits. A 
fixed allocation also ensures that the behavior of the inframarginal firms is unaffected; that is, 
firms that would definitely (or definitely not) go ahead with the project will not change their 
decisions based on small changes in the baseline allocation. However, for projects closer to the 
borderline, the exact allocation will matter.  
Since the allocation is conditional on participating, it may not offer accurate incentives if 
historical emissions under- or overestimate counterfactual emissions, particularly if investments 
are lumpy.16 For a firm whose emissions would grow (or grow faster than a trend), an 
                                                 
15 If baselines reflected future behavior and current emissions practices affect the future baseline, then an incentive 
would exist to increase emissions before joining a CDM project. This is why a historical emissions approach should 
be based on emissions that occurred prior to implementation of CDM. This of course leaves open the question of 
how CDM baselines are defined for new projects; some options for doing this are discussed below. 
16 See Baumol and Oates (1988), Chapter 14 for the problem of long-run inefficiency of grandfathered permits 
conditional on entry into and nonexit from the regulated industry. Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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underallocation would mean the permit rents might not cover the fixed costs of a worthwhile 
investment. For a firm whose emissions would decline anyway, an overallocation would induce 
participation that might not otherwise be worthwhile, given monitoring or fixed abatement costs. 
However, to the extent actual baseline emissions would decline because of investments that are 
profitable regardless of participation, overparticipation does not necessarily imply 
overinvestment. 
For participating firms, the primary loss in terms of global welfare arises not from 
distorting incentives to individual firms but from expanding the global emissions cap by 
allocating too much to firms that would have made the investments anyway for purely economic 
reasons. The magnitude of this loss depends once again on the difference between prospective 
marginal damages from future climate change and marginal costs of abatement, and on the size 
of the overallocation to the inframarginal firms. Unnecessary monitoring costs may also be a 
problem. For marginal firms, the welfare loss from inaccurate baseline assessment is not only 
expansion (or contraction) of the global cap, but also inefficient investment or forgone 
opportunities. 
Industry Average Emissions  
Industry average emissions rates are a familiar permit allocation method in tradable 
performance standards (TPS) systems. However, a rule using the average sectoral emissions rate 
as a baseline for CDM projects creates an unusual type of TPS. First, permits can be traded 
outside the sector. This means that the average emissions rate is an allocation rather than a 
binding performance standard for CDM participants, and the permit price will be determined by 
international markets rather than adjusted according to the scope of participation within the 
sector. Second, the program is voluntary.  
The second point means that the option to join the program or not, combined with this 
form of allocation, creates a selection bias. A relatively clean firm can join the program, do little 
in terms of reduction, and still receive a net transfer for having below-average emissions. On the 
other hand, a very dirty firm may have inexpensive options for reducing its emissions but must Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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push its emissions below the average to receive a net transfer, and that transfer must then offset 
the full cost of all reductions to make participation worthwhile.  
Thus, this method tends to provide insufficient incentives for high emitters, since they are 
allocated only a fraction of their actual counterfactual emissions. Meanwhile, it overrewards not 
only firms that would reduce their emissions in the future anyway, but also those that are already 
relatively low emitters. One method to prevent firms from joining without making significant 
efforts to reduce emissions is to require major investments as a prerequisite for participation. 
Although this requirement would deter some below-average emitters from joining, it would 
encourage others to undertake costly investments that are not justified, since the value of the 
allocation outweighs the environmental gains. 
Emissions Rate Baselines 
In practice, both the historical and average emissions baselines might not be allocated in 
lump sum, but rather in rate-based form.  For example, instead of using a fixed baseline, permits 
might be allocated according to a firm’s historical emissions rate times actual output (or perhaps 
use of some input), in order to incorporate trends in demand and production. Although this rule 
might in some ways make baselines more realistic and responsive to external conditions, it is 
important to recognize the impact on incentives. Allocating the baseline based on a current 
behavior (like actual output) generates a subsidy for that behavior. As a consequence of the 
production subsidy, the firm has an incentive not to reduce overall emissions through 
conservation, but rather to focus on emissions rate reduction.17 
Such a method has the same complications as the previous ones in terms of investment 
and participation decisions. To the extent that it would be more accurate, those complications 
will be mitigated. However, to the extent that the rule is overly generous, the subsidy impact 
looms larger. Which effect dominates depends on the project characteristics. 
                                                 
17 See Fischer (2001). Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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In the absence of other market imperfections, an output subsidy would create efficiency 
losses. However, in certain circumstances, some of which may be quite valid for CDM 
situations, an output subsidy could enhance the gains from a project. For example, the 
developing country’s plant owner may be a poorly regulated monopoly, underproviding its 
output (e.g., electricity) and overcharging customers. An output subsidy can help bring prices 
and production more in line with what society would want. The firm joining the CDM program 
may face competition from other nonparticipating domestic producers, whose emissions thereby 
remain unregulated. If these other firms are close competitors and have higher emissions rates, 
an output subsidy can help divert production back toward the now-regulated participating firm, 
further reducing overall emissions (see Bernard et al. 2001).  If, however, the participating firm 
is a manufacturing facility competing primarily with firms in Annex B countries, an output 
subsidy would generally not be warranted to prevent leakage (although it might offset other 
imperfections in developing countries’ output markets).  
Thus, the desirability of output-based allocations in a CDM program requires a more 
comprehensive understanding of market environments in the candidate countries. Unfortunately, 
the appropriateness of output allocations is likely to vary depending on individual project 
circumstances. Having different allocation rules for different participating industries and 
countries based on fine-grained details of market structure and performance is unlikely to be 
possible. 
Indeed, the strength of the particular subsidy will depend on both the price of CERs and 
the baseline rule.  Historical emissions rates are project-specific, so firms with higher previous 
emissions will receive a stronger output subsidy.  An industry average emissions rate offers a 
consistent output subsidy across firms in that industry, but not between sectors.  A tradeoff thus 
arises between accuracy of allocation and appropriateness of the output support. 
Expected Emissions  
With an expected emissions rule, the third-party verifier would attempt to gather project-
specific as well as industry-specific information and make an educated guess about the likely 
baseline emissions in the absence of policy. As with the industry average rules, to the extent that Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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expectations are inaccurate, marginal investment incentives will not be efficient. However, to the 
extent that expectations are more accurate than the other, cruder methods, the allocation of CERs 
will be more appropriate and result in less expansion of the global emissions cap.  
This rule is likely to be more expensive to implement because of the costs of information 
gathering. Also, this approach risks inviting strategic behavior that attempts to create “better” 
sets of expectations. 
Participation Requirements 
Designing eligibility requirements presents another opportunity for screening projects 
worthy of receiving any baseline allocation. One could require a major investment rather than 
minor improvements. For example, building a wind farm that clearly would otherwise be 
uneconomic could qualify, but not updating the boilers in a power plant. However, by including 
only “clearly uneconomic” projects, one risks excluding many projects that deserve to qualify 
and cost less (being less uneconomic). Participation requirements would better serve the goal of 
promoting cost-effective emissions reductions by focusing on eliminating the “clearly economic” 
projects. Still, such rules are likely to suffer from the same problems of asymmetric information 
as the baseline rules. 
Sustainable development benefits are intended as another requirement for eligibility in a 
CDM project. Such ancillary benefits can be important and represent another yardstick for 
participation in addition to emissions abatement. They can legitimately affect the public 
priorities for projects and can affect the welfare costs of erring in the baseline allocations. 
Understanding how requires knowing not only the size of the sustainable development benefits, 
but also how they might be correlated with the private economic and environmental benefits 
driving investment and policy choices. 
Conclusion 
Selecting a reasonable method for determining baseline emissions is critical to the 
success of incorporating project-based emissions reductions strategies into an international 
program for reducing greenhouse gases. The Clean Development Mechanism is a main focus for Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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baseline rules, but the issue also applies to strategies for carbon sinks and potential projects in 
developed countries. 
The challenges for baseline determination include general uncertainty, asymmetric 
information between the certifying authority and participants, costly administrative and 
information-gathering activities, and insufficient policy tools to ensure revelation of true 
emissions. The potential benefits are the availability of less expensive abatement opportunities. 
The risks are certifying too many emissions reductions and expanding the emissions cap for 
countries adhering to the Kyoto Protocol. 
The most likely baseline rules are based on 1) historical emissions, 2) average industry 
emissions, with or without an investment requirement, and 3) expected emissions. Historical 
emissions, assuming they do not underestimate actual emissions trends, generally provide good 
investment incentives, but they may substantially overallocate and constitute a windfall to firms 
that would find such investments profitable even in the absence of a CDM policy. Industry 
averaging policies would overallocate to some firms and underallocate to others, resulting in 
poorer investment incentives, less cost-effective abatement, and allocation of too many certified 
emissions reductions. The latter two problems are exacerbated when firms can participate in the 
program without making any required investments. 
Gathering project-specific information to make a reasonable estimate of future baseline 
emissions strikes a balance between the historical and the averaging methods. Increased 
accuracy would reduce the inefficiencies in investment incentives compared with averaging and 
reduce overallocation compared with historical emissions. However, this method would require 
that the certifying authority have access to necessary information at costs that do not outweigh 
the benefits of greater accuracy. 
It has been shown that allocation rules alone cannot induce firms to truthfully reveal their 
baseline emissions. Although a third-party certification authority would not be able to set the 
transaction price, one could incorporate a quality parameter to CERs, which would function like 
a price differential. By allowing the certification authority to contract over two different project 
aspects—baseline emissions and abatement quality—one may restore power to design more 
efficient revelation mechanisms. This option will need to be the subject of future research. Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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All of the rules at hand could, in theory, be implemented in lump-sum or rate-based form. 
Lump-sum allocation, in a situation where participating firms are competing closely with 
nonparticipating firms, could raise marginal production costs and divert some output to higher-
emitting firms. Rate-based allocation, on the other hand, could provide inefficient subsidies that 
outweigh the leakage potential and risk exacerbating the effects of inaccuracies in the baseline 
rule. For longer time horizons, rate-based allocation might more easily accommodate changing 
market conditions over time.  
Since participation in these emissions reduction projects is voluntary, any baseline rule is 
likely to err by allocating too much overall. The cost savings must then justify not only the costs 
of administrating the program but also the costs of expanding the cap. These latter costs, judged 
in welfare terms, depend on the marginal damages of climate change and how they compare with 
the price of emissions permits. One could argue that the cost of having a bit more global 
emissions may be a lot lower than the cost of encumbering the nascent institutions for 
developing countries’ participation with complex project approval criteria that reward rent 
seeking, distort markets, and so forth.18 
Indeed, the real benefits could come from the successful experience and development that 
lead non-Annex I parties to join in the emissions cap, thus eliminating the need for determining 
baselines for individual projects. Also deserving mention are the sustainable development 
benefits the countries get even before graduating into the cap. Although harder to quantify and 
not included in this calculation, these benefits offer a reason to lean toward a generous approach. 
In the meantime, however, further study is needed to evaluate which baseline rules are most 
appropriate in what situations. In particular, for the different types of projects, we need to better 
understand the correlation between abatement investments and other productivity enhancements, 
as well as the nature of uncertainties and information availability. Furthermore, we need to 
recognize the impact of market imperfections and institutional differences in developing 
countries and how they might affect participation, investment, and allocation. 
                                                 
18 See Kopp et al. (2002). Resources for the Future  Fischer 
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